Form and Concept

Here are some of my thoughts concerning the processes involving form and concept described by Barthes:


The assumption that in myth-making, concept, or first-order signified, must become impoverished to make room for the second-order signified does not sit perfectly well with me. To use the Paris-Match example, the photo of the young soldier pre-cover (1st order) arguably contains a certain history. Nothing about this history, to my knowledge, is lost upon placing this on the cover. (Any lack of history would be equally evident in the image in an isolated situation.) Rather, new meaning is achieved through the addition of other signage (ie the title, the "coverness," the zeitgeist). As such, this myth is constructed in a purely additive fashion, and is also not simply contained in the photo-- which has, again, not lost anything (though is perhaps masked). In short, I think that myth is perhaps constructed through the propinquity of un-"emptied" first-order semiological signs.


Returning to the same example, I would also argue that the "history" of the first-order sign, which is supposedly erased prior to (or because of?) the imposition of the 2nd order signified is in itself a second-order semiological imposition. Here's a quick diagram of my thinking:

How Barthes states process:

1- Signifier-- photo of boy 1- Signified-- history
2- SIGNIFIER-composite 2- SIGNIFIED- new myth of patriotism or whatever

My counterdiagram:

1-Signifier- pixels/film 1-Signified- face of boy
2 SIGNIFIER- composite 2- SIGNIFIED- history

Essentially, I think that Barthes' description is fallacious in assuming that the history is the 1st-order signified within a photo.

Finally, Barthes appears to assign values to different signifieds. Specifically, the assignment of a higher value of authenticity to the 1st-order than to the 2nd. In the example I've been using, for instance, Barthes language implies that the photo's "history" is somehow a more legitimate, natural or proper thing to be signified than the concept which (as Barthes argues) "empties" it. This seems arbitrary, and I would love to discuss this idea that a signifier is somehow predisposed to a certain, more "appropriate" or authentic signified.